Articles Posted in Personal Injury

A lawsuit alleging childhood sexual abuse was filed yesterday in Du Page County, Illinois against Bill Gothard and the Institute of Basic Life Principles that he founded in 1961. The lawsuit filed by 10 women includes allegations of rape, molestation and sexual harassment. The allegations date back to at least 1992.

The statute of limitations will surely be an issue. For sexual abuse that occurred as early as 1992, the Illinois statute of limitations in effect for childhood sexual abuse is 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 This 1991 version of the statute of limitations provides that an action for childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within 2 years of reaching 18 or 2 years from the date the person abused discovers the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and that injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse….“but in no event may an action for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse be commenced more than 12 years after the person abused reaches the age of 18.” 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2

This means that if a person abused reaches the age of 30 prior to January 1, 1994, the 12 year statute of repose forever bars their claim. Illinois has amended the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse in 1994, 2003, and 2011. The 2011 version, which is currently in effect, increased the time to bring the action to 20 years after the person abused reaches 18. My blog of March 28, 2012 sets forth in detail the various statute of limitations deadlines of the 1991, 1994, 2003 and 2011 versions of the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse in Illinois.

Fixing liability on prior employers of known sexual abusers who withhold information of that abuse to subsequent employers where employee proceeds to sexually abuse additional minors has never been addressed by the Illinois high court. The Illinois Supreme Court in Doe-3 v. Mc Lean County Dist. 5, 973 N.E. 2d 880 (2012) addressed this issue head on. In Doe-3, the trail court dismissed action by two minor sexual abuse victims against prior school district employer of pedophile that alleged failure to disclose to subsequent employer of pedophile that he had been disciplined for “sexual harassment, sexual grooming, and/or sexual abuse.” The trial court found that prior school district had no duty to minor sexual abuse victims. The appellate court reversed the dismissal and the high court affirmed the appellate court’s holding albeit on different grounds.

The Supreme Court acknowledged that: “In Illinois an affirmative duty to aid or protect another against an unreasonable risk of physical harm arises only in the context of a legally recognized duty.” Doe-3, 973 N.E. 2d 880, 888; Simkus v. CSX Transportation, 965 N.E. 2d 1092 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 2012); and Iseberg v. Gross, 227 Ill. 2d 78, 87-88, 879 N.E. 2d 278 (2007). The Supreme Court noted that plaintiffs had not plead any of the recognized “special relationships”. The Doe-3 court stated: “Nevertheless, we find that plaintiffs have alleged circumstances which do give rise to a duty owed by defendants in this case.” 973 N.E. 2d 880, 889.

The issue the Doe-3 court dealt with encompasses a school districts’ duty to disclose prior history of sexual abuse by one of its teachers to a subsequent school district employer of that teacher. The court began its duty analysis observing: “…every person owes a duty of ordinary care to all others to guard against injuries which naturally flow as a reasonably probable and foreseen consequence of an act, and such a duty does not depend on privity of contract, privity of interest or the proximity of relationship but extends to remote and unknown persons.” 973 N.E. 2d 880, 887-888.

In the wake of the conviction of Jerry Sandusky for sexual abusing minors, Illinois has amended The Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act, 325 ILCS 5/4. The amendment which became effective June 27, 2012, adds: personnel of institutions of higher education and director or staff of athletic program, to the extensive list of people who are mandatory reporters of knowledge of abuse or neglect of a child.

The law-325 ILCS 5/4-has for years covered physicians, residents, nurses, dentists, chiropractors, EMTs, crisis line personnel, nursery school personnel, teachers, educational personnel (which did not until recently include “institutions of higher education”), members of school board, social workers, law enforcement officers, psychologists, probation officers, foster parents, truant officers, and personnel at various state agencies. They all have a duty when “having reasonable cause to believe a child known to them in their professional or official capacity may be an abused child or neglected child” to “immediately report or cause a report to be made to the Department” (Dept. of Children and Family Services)325 ILCS 5/4. Failure to report may well be the evidence to hold the institution of higher education or athletic program financially accountable when they fail to insure their personnel are aware of and do report suspected abuse of children.

The penalties for failing to report or filing a false report range from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 3 felony. The thrust of the recent amendment of the Act and in including “personnel of institutions of higher education” and “director or staff of..athletic program” is to address precisely the situation that occurred at Penn State University where numerous members of the athletic department and many administrators including the president of the university were aware of reports of childhood sexual abuse and did nothing about it. Neither the Sandusky saga nor Penn State legal problems will go away soon. It is difficult for many of us to imagine grown men becoming aware of a pattern of sexual abuse of young boys by a university coach, and not stopping it immediately and clearly reporting the criminal behavior. At Penn State the sanctity of their football program and the money it generates trumped the natural tendency of grown men to protect a young boy from a sexual predator like Sandusky. Hopefully this amendment may save a child in Illinois from undergoing what Sandusky’s victims endured!

Illinois sexual abuse lawyers representing clients who were abused when they were children are confronted with four different versions of 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2. A careful analysis of the four distinct versions of the statute is essential in determining whether the claim is viable or fails due to the statute of limitation and/or the statute of repose.

The 1991 version (effective 1-1-91) of 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 provides that an action for childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within 2 years of reaching 18 or 2 years from the date the person abused discovers the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and that an injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse. The statute of repose in the statute provided that : “…but in no event may an action for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse be commenced more than 12 years after the date on which the person abuse attains the age of 18 years.”

The Illinois Appellate Court in Wisniewski v. Dioceses of Belleville, 406 Ill. App. 3d 1119, 1150, 943 N.E. 2d 43, 69 (2011), stated: “The difference between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose is that a statute of limitations governs the time within which lawsuits may be commenced after a cause of action has accrued, while a statute of repose extinguishes the action after a fixed period of time, regardless of when the action accrued. “The effect of the 1991 version of the statute was to “bar anyone over the age of 30 from bringing an action for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse.” Doe v. Diocese of Dallas, 243 Ill. 2d 393, 408, 917 N.E. 2d 475, 484 (2009).